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Some Reflections on Proximate Cause
David E. Seidelson
I. THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
Black's Law Dictionary offers this primary definition of proximate
cause: "That which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."' One could hardly fashion a more suc-
cinct definition for one of the most elusive concepts in the law.2 And,
as is frequently the case when subtle concepts are reduced to terse
verbalization, one could hardly fashion a sentence of equal length con-
taining so many conclusional words and phrases. What is a "natural se-
quence"? What constitutes a "natural and continuous sequence"? And
when is an "intervening cause ''efficient"? Those questions are not
raised to condemn Black's; they are intended only to suggest the near
impossibility of imputing to the concept of proximate cause a brief
definition which will be of meaningful assistance to a court confronting
a proximate cause issue.
EDITOR'S NOTE: The author is Professor of Law at The National Law Center of The
George Washington University. B.A., University of Pittsburgh (1951); LL. B., University
of Pittsburgh School of Law (1956). Professor Seidelson wishes to acknowledge the con-
tribution made by the following authors to the subject of proximate cause. While the ap-
proach of this article is relatively original, scholars have never regarded this area of law
as a static one and the diversity of their views attests to this fact. See, e.g., A. BECHT &
F. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES
(1961); G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN
TORT LAW (1965); J. HENDERSON, JR. & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS (1975); R.
KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1963); C. MORRIS & C.R. MORRIS, JR., MORRIS
ON TORTS (2d ed. 1980); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1977); W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973).
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (5th ed. 1979).
2. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]
for this assertion:
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To provide such meaningful assistance, it may be helpful to deter-
mine just when a proximate cause issue first confronts a court. An
understanding of the procedural aspect of proximate cause may concur-
rently diminish the possibility that an issue will be prematurely
characterized as one involving proximate cause, and clarify the under-
lying reason for the proximate cause requirement. Until the plaintiff
has satisfied the tripartite evidentiary conditions of: (1) the defendant's
carelessness; (2) the plaintiff's injury; and (3) a factual cause and effect
relationship between that carelessness and that injury,' no proximate
cause issue has yet arisen.
This conclusion gives rise to the following question: Why doesn't
evidence of the defendant's carelessness, the plaintiff's injury, and a
factual causal relationship between the two constitute a legally suffi-
cient case, without consideration of proximate cause? Such evidence
undoubtedly identifies the "bad guy," the injured victim, and the fac-
tual relationship between the bad guy's conduct and the victim's in-
jury. Why is the plaintiff further required to meet the proximate cause
requirement? Apparently, the law recognizes an inherent impropriety
in permitting liability to become wholly disproportionate to culpabil-
ity.4 As a result, not even the culpable defendant will be liable to the
innocent and injured plaintiff in every case in which the defendant's
culpable conduct is a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury. Therefore,
There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Nor,
despite the manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject, is there
yet any general agreement as to the proper approach.
Id. at 236 (footnote omitted).
3. Failure on the part of the plaintiff to introduce evidence of any one of these
elements precludes recovery without the necessity of considering proximate cause. The
third requirement, that of showing the factual cause and effect relationship between the
defendant's carelessness and the plaintiff's injury, is known as the sine qua non rule:
[M]any courts have derived a rule, commonly known as the "but for" or "sine qua
non" rule, which may be stated as follows: The defendant's conduct is not a cause of
the event, if the event would have occurred without it. At most this must be a rule
of exclusion: if the event would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's
negligence, it still does not follow that there is liability, since considerations other
than causation ... may prevent it.
Id. at 238-39 (footnotes omitted).
4. See Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1955), where Chief Judge
Magruder stated for the court:
Back of the requirement that the defendant's culpable act must have been a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm is no doubt the widespread conviction that it
would be disproportionately burdensome to hold a culpable actor potentially liable
for all the injurious consequences that may flow from his act, i.e., that would not
have been inflicted "but for" the occurrence of the act. This is especially so where
the injurious consequence was the result of negligence merely.
Id. at 610.
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in each case in which a court confronts a proximate cause issue, it
should resolve that issue in light of the basic reason for the proximate
cause requirement, which is to ensure that liability does not become
wholly disproportionate to culpability.5 Given this reason, the court
should remain sensitive to the various factors which pertain to the
degree of culpability of the defendant in the particular case.
Presumably, as the relative degree of culpability is enhanced, the less
likely it will be that the liability sought to be imposed on the defend-
ant would be wholly disproportionate to that culpability.
A court's basic sense of propriety and fairness only partially ac-
counts for its attempt to balance liability against culpability. Apart
from these fundamental juristic principles, a more pragmatic reason
exists for the judicial concern that liability should not be permitted to
become wholly disproportionate to culpability. Were such liability to
be imposed, a number of familiar activities might become economically
prohibitive. To the extent that those activities achieve a relatively
high level of social utility, society, as well as the defendant, may lose.'
Consequently, in a case presenting a proximate cause issue, the court
should consider the relative level of social utility of the activity in
which the defendant was engaged at the time of his careless conduct a
factor in determining his culpability.
When a court is asked by a defendant to rule that, as a matter of
law, his conduct was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, it
should generally refrain from doing so for two reasons. The first is
substantive; the second, procedural. The first reason why a judge
should give careful consideration before rendering a directed verdict
has already been partly identified: before a proximate cause issue can
arise, the court must receive evidence of the defendant's carelessness,
the plaintiffs injury, and a factual cause and effect relationship be-
tween the two. Once the evidence has identified the "bad guy" and the
victim injured as the result of the bad guy's conduct, fairness dictates
that even though the judge may be tempted to grant the motion, if
there is any doubt he should give the victim the benefit of the doubt.
5. Throughout this article, the phrase "liability wholly disproportionate to culpabil-
ity" is used both to describe the substantive standard which ought to be applied and to
emphasize that proximate cause cannot he calculated with mathematical nicety, but rather
expresses a balance of various factors according to a rule of reasonability. The choice of
the term "culpability" is not reflective of a retributive theory of tort liability, but denotes
a compensatory approach predicated upon an alleged fault. Consequently, the subject of
strict liability is beyond the scope of this article.
6. See Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978), where
the court stated: "If the [contractor] defendant's liability were extended to all those who
suffered any ... loss, its liability could become grossly disproportionate to its fault. Such
potential liability would unduly burden any construction in a business area." Id. at 470,
583 P.2d at 1005. See notes 89-93 and accompanying text infra.
1980
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This gives the jury the opportunity to recompense the plaintiff by im-
posing adverse economic consequences upon the culpable actor.
The second reason for the judge's self-restraint in ruling on the mo-
tion modifies the discretion of the first: if the proximate cause question
is a close one, that is, a reasonable fact-finder could just as easily con-
clude that the plaintiffs injury was or was not proximately caused by
the defendant's negligence, then a matter-of-law determination is
technically inappropriate. The defendant's effort to secure a judicial
ruling on the absence of proximate cause is likely to take the form of a
motion for nonsuit or directed verdict. Assuming that the three previ-
ously mentioned evidentiary requisites have been satisfied,' either mo-
tion requests the court to rule, as a matter of law, that the defendant's
conduct was still not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. If a
reasonable fact-finder, namely, a jury, could resolve the proximate
cause issue either way, under standard civil procedure the court
should deny the motion and submit the issue to the jury. Moreover,
submission to the jury when the court is not justified in concluding
that proximate cause does not exist as a matter of law tends to amel-
iorate any unfairness to the defendant arising out of calling the close
ones against the defendant. Even if the court denies the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict, the jury may still determine factually
that the defendant's conduct was not a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury.
A proper starting point for any worthwhile analysis of proximate
cause is undoubtedly the case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.' Due
to the carelessness of the defendant's employees, a package wrapped
in newspaper was knocked from the arm of a passenger attempting to
board one of defendant's trains. The unmarked package fell between
the boarding platform and the train so that the fireworks that it con-
tained exploded. The explosion caused a set of scales located a substan-
tial distance away to fall on the plaintiff, Mrs. Palsgraf. To recover for
the injuries thus sustained, Mrs. Palsgraf sued the railroad. A judg-
ment for the plaintiff was reversed by the New York Court of Appeals
because of its determination that, as a matter of law, the carelessness
of the defendant's employee had not been a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.
Cardozo, writing for the majority, arrived at that conclusion because
the plaintiff had not been within the orbit of risk created by the
negligence attributable to the defendant; at the time of that negli-
gence, no injury of any kind to the plaintiff was reasonably
foreseeable. Andrews, dissenting, wrote: "What we do mean by the
7. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
8. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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word 'proximate' is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a
rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics."'
It has become popular to cite that dissenting opinion of Judge An-
drews with approbation,"0 and, indeed, it is difficult to dispute the con-
clusion that proximate cause is a matter of "practical politics." Still, it
seems that Cardozo's orbit of risk approach has a couple of advantages
over Andrews' pragmatic approach. Even to one accepting the quoted
excerpt from Andrews' dissenting opinion as an accurate depiction of
proximate cause, a difficult question remains. How is a trial court, con-
fronted with a defendant's motion for directed verdict on the basis of
the plaintiffs failure to satisfy proximate cause, to apply Andrews'
"practical politics"? How are the considerations "of convenience, of
public policy, of a rough sense of justice" to be applied to the specific
evidence before the court? Cardozo's orbit of risk test at least cir-
cumscribes the issues to be considered by the court by directing its at-
tention to this relatively specific evidentiary question: Viewing the
plaintiffs evidence in the most favorable light, could a reasonable jury
conclude that defendant's negligence created a reasonably foreseeable
risk of injury of any kind to the plaintiff? If the trial court answers
that question affirmatively, the defendant's motion should be denied; if
negatively, then the defendant's motion should be granted because the
defendant's negligence was evidently not a proximate cause of the plain-
tiffs injury. To the extent that Cardozo's approach provides the trial
court with an enhanced degree of specificity, thus affording a more
9. Id. at 352, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
10. See Petition of Kinsman Transport Co. (Kinsman 1), 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964).
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965), where Judge Friendly stated:
[P]erhaps in the long run one returns to Judge Andrews' statement in Palsgraf...
"It is all a question of expediency, * * * of fair judgment, always keeping in mind
the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in
keeping with the general understanding of mankind."
Id. at 725 (quoting Judge Andrews' dissenting opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,
248 N.Y. at 354-55, 162 N.E. at 104) (citation omitted; alteration in original). See Petition
of Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman 11), 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). "In the final analysis, the
circumlocution whether posed in terms of 'foreseeability,' 'duty,' 'proximate,' 'remoteness,'
etc. seems unavoidable. As we have previously noted, 338 F.2d at 725, we return to
Judge Andrews' frequently quoted statement in Palsgraf .... Id. at 825 (Kaufman, J.)
(citing Kinsman I, 338 F.2d at 725). See also Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MIcE. L. REV.
1 (1953), where the author states:
[T]he opinion of Andrews is as barren as is Cardozo's. It does, I think, come closer
to a recognition of the difficulties of the problem and the many factors that may
bear on it, and is less arbitrary in postulating an ironclad rule; but the formula it
offers is no better as a universal solvent or a philosopher's stone.
Id. at 27.
1980
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refined test for resolving the proximate cause issue, it enjoys a marked
advantage over Andrews' approach.
A second advantage which the orbit of risk test possesses over the
practical politics test also relates to specificity, but in a somewhat less
mechanical fashion. It appears that Andrews' practical politics ap-
proach at least nominally incorporates each of the considerations set
forth earlier in this article as the basis for the proximate cause re-
quirement and the factors to which a court confronted with a prox-
imate cause issue should remain sensitive. However, it would be dif-
ficult to satisfactorily prove that when Andrews' approach is actually
applied to particular cases, these principles are consistently emobodied
in the results. Each of us has subjective concepts of convenience,
public policy, and a rough sense of justice, as does each trial judge and
probably each member of an appellate court. As those individual con-
cepts shift from judge to judge and court to court, practical politics,
because of its unique vulnerability to idiosyncratic application, pro-
vides relatively little assurance that the basic reason for the proximate
cause requirement and, consequently, the underlying factors to which
the court should be sensitive, will be recognized and applied in a man-
ner calculated to achieve the intended purposes.
On the other hand, Cardozo's orbit of risk test provides, to some ex-
tent at least, an inherent assurance that those purposes will be served.
There is an essential relationship between the degree of culpability of
a defendant's conduct and the number of persons foreseeably threat-
ened with injury by that conduct. If a defendant's negligence creates a
reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to hundreds, then it is logical to
assume that the culpability of that conduct will generally exceed the
culpability of negligence which creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of
injury to but one individual. Consequently, where a plaintiff's oppor-
tunity to recover from a defendant depends upon the conclusion that
the culpable conduct at issue created a reasonably foreseeable risk of
injury to the plaintiff, the likelihood that liability will become wholly
disproportionate to culpability is diminished substantially. Therefore,
Cardozo's orbit of risk test accomplishes two important objectives: It
provides trial courts with a relatively precise test to apply in resolving
proximate cause issues and it complements the basic reason for the
proximate cause requirement.
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf also provides a prelude to the
process of refining the concept of proximate cause in accordance with
its underlying rationale. The Justice referred to the then prevalent
assumption that once a wrong affecting a particular plaintiff has been
established, it may support the imposition of liability for any and all
consequences. He noted that it may be necessary, however, to modify
the liability created by a negligent act when an injury unforeseeable in
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degree or kind obtains in reality instead of its foreseeable conse-
quences."1 Having found as a matter of law that the plaintiff was
without the orbit of risk, ie., that the defendant's negligence created
no reasonably foreseeable risk of any kind to the plaintiff, Justice Car-
dozo had no need to decide the nature and extent of injury for which
the defendant might have been liable had the plaintiff been within the
orbit of risk. However, the assumption recognized in the dictum in
Palsgraf had derived from an earlier decision of renown, In re
Polemis."
In Polemis, agents of the defendant negligently caused a heavy
plank to fall into the hold of the plaintiff's 3 ship. The plank caused a
spark which ignited petrol vapor in the hold; the ensuing fire resulted
in the total loss of the ship. Confronted with a factual finding that the
spark and, consequently, the fire were not reasonably foreseeable, the
court in Polemis was required to determine the propriety of an ar-
bitrator's decision that the defendant should be liable for the total loss.
The court noted a portion of the defendant's argument against the im-
position of such liability:
The [defendant's] junior counsel sought to draw a distinction between the
anticipation of the extent of damage resulting from a negligent act, and
the anticipation of the type of damage resulting from such an act. He ad-
mitted that it could not lie in the mouth of a person whose negligent act
had caused damage to say that he could not reasonably have foreseen the
extent of the damage, but he contended that the negligent person was en-
titled to rely upon the fact that he could not reasonably have anticipated
the type of damage which resulted from his negligent act."4
The court's response to the argument was succinct: "I do not think
that the distinction can be admitted."' 5 Consequently, the court af-
firmed the arbitrator's award. In effect, the court held that, where the
11. Justice Cardozo stated:
We may assume, without deciding, that negligence, not at large or in the abstract,
but in relation to the plaintiff, would entail liability for any and all consequences,
however novel or extraordinary .... There is room for argument that a distinction
is to be drawn according to the diversity of interests invaded by the act, as where
conduct negligent in that it threatens an insignificant invasion of an interest in
property results in an unforeseeable invasion of an interest of another order, as,
e.g., one of bodily security. Perhaps other distinctions may be necessary. We do not
go into the question now. The consequences to be followed must first be rooted in a
wrong.
Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 346-47, 162 N.E. at 101 (citations omitted).
12. [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.).
13. "Messrs. Polemis and Boyazides [were] the owners of the Greek steamship
Thrasyvoulos ...." Id. at 561. For ease of verbalization, here and at other points in the
article, the singular form is used in referring to the ship owners.
14. Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 572.
1980
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defendant's negligence created a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury
of any kind to the plaintiff and that negligence resulted in injury to
the plaintiff, the defendant would be liable for that injury, irrespective
of the extent of injury and without regard to the type of injury.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
LIABILITY AND THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE
It is difficult to either condone or repudiate the result in Polemis
since the court's opinion does not provide sufficient facts for such an
assessment. For example, did the negligent dropping of the "heavy
plank" into the hold create a reasonably foreseeable risk of (a) only
relatively insignificant damage to the ship or (b) substantial and
perhaps even irreparable damage to the ship?" If (a), the result is
troubling; if (b), it is not: the difference between (a) and (b) marks a
substantial difference in the relative degree of culpability attributable
to the defendant. Since the proximate cause requirement exists to
assure that liability does not become wholly disproportionate to
culpability, the relative degree of culpability of the defendant in
Polemis seems to have been a legitimate, even critical, factor for
judicial consideration. Setting aside, for the moment, the relationship
between the type of injury reasonably foreseeable and a defendant's
culpability, the extent of damage reasonably foreseeable as a conse-
quence of the negligence attributable to a defendant would seem to
bear an intimate relationship with the relative degree of culpability of
that negligence. Yet even the defendant's counsel in Polemis conceded
that the defendant could not avoid liability simply because the extent
of damage sustained exceeded the reasonably foreseeable extent of
damage. Why was the relationship between liability and the extent of
damage reasonably foreseeable automatically negated? The case of Mc-
Cahill v. New York Transportation Co. illuminates the reasoning
behind this position."
In McCahill, a taxicab owned by the defendant struck the plaintiffs
intestate one night on Broadway in New York City "under cir-
cumstances which, as detailed by the most favorable evidence, permit-
ted the jury to find that the former was guilty of negligence and the
latter free from contributory negligence. As a result of the accident
the intestate was thrown about twenty feet, his thigh broken and his
knee injured."'8 Subsequently, the victim died of delirium tremens,
16. "In the present case it is clear that the act causing the plank to fall was in law a
negligent act, because some damage to the ship might reasonably be anticipated." Id. at
575.
17. 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911).
18. Id. at 222, 94 N.E. at 617.
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"precipitated" 9 by the impact injuries but obviously contributed to by
"the preexisting alcoholic condition of the intestate."20 On appeal,
defendant argued that, as a matter of law, the negligence attributable
to it was not a proximate cause of the intestate's death. 1 The court re-
jected this argument and affirmed the judgment' for the plaintiff by
wisely concluding that the negligent actor takes his victim as he finds
him. That conclusion comports with the basic concept of reasonable
foreseeability for a couple of reasons. 4 Wholly perfect physical
specimens are the exception rather than the rule. Consequently, if the
negligent actor's victim is less than a perfect specimen, the defendant's
reasonable expectations can hardly be said to have been frustrated. In
addition, the human body, magnificent as it is in its complexity and
functioning, is uniquely vulnerable to a nearly infinite variety of in-
juries when subjected to impact with inanimate objects. Therefore, the
negligent actor can hardly plead surprise when the nature or extent of
injury sustained by his victim proves to be extreme or even fatal.
When a taxicab strikes a pedestrian and sends the victim hurtling
twenty feet through the air, presumably to land on an unyielding
street, the responsible party should not be outraged by the imposition
of liability in a wrongful death action.
Those two factors - the rareness of perfect physical specimens and
the human body's vulnerability to severe injury or death - are com-
plemented by a third consideration which sustains the conclusion
19. Id. at 223, 94 N.E. at 617.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The McCahill court stated:
The principle has become familiar in many phases that a negligent person is
responsible for the direct effects of his acts, even if more serious, in cases of the
sick and infirm as well as in those of healthy and robust people, and its application
to the present case is not made less certain because the facts are somewhat
unusual and the intestate's prior disorder of a discreditable character. .. The
principle is also true although less familiar, that one who has negligently forwarded
a diseased condition and thereby hastened and prematurely caused death cannot
escape responsibility even though the disease probably would have resulted in
death at a later time without his agency.
Id. at 223-24, 94 N.E. at 617.
24. For the reasons stated in the text accompanying notes 25-28 infra, I would dis-
sent from Judge Friendly's view that:
The oft encountered argument that failure to limit liability to foreseeable conse-
quences may subject the defendant to a loss wholly out of proportion to his fault
seems scarcely consistent with the universally accepted rule that the defendant
takes the plaintiff as he finds him and will be responsible for the full extent of the
injury even though a latent susceptibility of the plaintiff renders this far more
serious than could reasonably have been anticipated.
Kinsman I, 338 F.2d at 724 (2d Cir. 1964).
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achieved in McCahill. Man is a product of more than two million years
of evolution, which indicates that it has taken a long time for human
beings to achieve their present level of development. Notwithstanding
that long period of common evolution and the resultant physiological
factors shared by all persons, each individual is unique and cannot be
replaced. The loss of a single human being is irreparable. When any in-
dividual has his physical integrity violated, with a resulting loss of
physical, mental, or emotional capacity, that diminution of capacity is
forever lost to the victim and to all of society. Very simply, human life
is precious. One whose culpable conduct terminates or diminishes a
human life should feel an appropriate sting of liability and the victim
or his dependent survivors should receive the most nearly adequate
compensation feasible. McCahill accomplishes those results.
But to what extent are those considerations applicable to Polemis,
where only property damage and no personal injury was involved?
Realistically, the distinction between property damage and personal in-
jury is oftentimes less significant in fact than in theory. Destroy my
briefs and notes for Torts and, in a very real sense, you have de-
stroyed a part of me: that physical and intellectual effort which pro-
duced those briefs and those notes. Similarly, destruction of the plain-
tiffs ship in Polemis destroyed that part of the plaintiff's physical and
intellectual effort which made the plaintiff's ownership of the vessel a
reality. Whether the property destroyed is my briefs and notes or the
ship in Polemis, however, the loss is modified by the fact that property
can be duplicated by the owner, to whom the capability for replacing it
may be attributed. Property is simply not as precious and irreplace-
able as human life. Moreover, property is not as vulnerable as human
life to a nearly endless variety of injuries differing in nature and ex-
tent as the result of trauma. Dropping a plank in the hold of a ship, ab-
sent reasonably foreseeable intervening events, plainly does not pose a
realistic risk of the total loss of the ship; dropping a plank of even
modest size on the head of a human being does pose a significant risk
of death or permanent injury. The liability imposed on the defendant
in Polemis probably did come as an outrageous suprise which
frustrated the reasonable expectations of even the admittedly culpable
defendant.
Polemis offers a potentially ameliorating factor, however, in that the
court noted the seaworthiness of the ship prior to the fire in assessing
the defendant's liability.' This implies that, to the extent that the ship
was imperfect prior to the culpability attributable to the defendant,
the damages assessed for its loss would be diminished. A battered old
25. When the ship "was placed at the charterers' disposal . . . she [was] tight,
staunch, strong and every way fitted for ordinary cargo service .... " 3 K.B. at 561.
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hulk simply isn't as valuable as a letter-perfect ship. Yet that same
consequence existed in McCahill; to the extent that the decedent's preex-
isting alcoholism would provide a shorter life expectancy or a lower
level of earning capacity, the damages imposed on the defendant would
be reduced." Assuming that the imperfections of the ship in Polemis
and the pedestrian in McCahill were comparable in terms of their
potential to mitigate damages, two critical distinctions remain: (1)
Human life is more precious than property; and (2) human life is more
vulnerable than property to injury of a nature and extent nearly im-
possible to predict with any accuracy. Those distinctions suggest that,
even to one acquiescing wholly in the McCahill decision, the Polemis
conclusion (and the defense counsel's concession) that liability could not
be limited to the extent of damage reasonably foreseeable does not
necessarily follow. Indeed, such a limitation would seem to be entirely
consistent with the basic reason for the proximate cause requirement
of ensuring that liability does not become wholly disproportionate to
culpability.
Nor would that limitation impose unfair burdens on the plaintiff in
Polemis. The plaintiff's recovery then would have been limited to the
damage reasonably foreseeable from dropping a plank into the ship's
hold, without regard to the destruction caused by the not reasonably
foreseeable fire. In that case, plaintiff would have confronted the
evidentiary problem of presenting legitimate evidence of the likely
damage absent the fire. Where personal injury or wrongful death ac-
tions are concerned, however, imposing on the plaintiff the burden of
presenting wholly hypothetical evidence seems abhorrent. It is simply
too difficult to realistically determine the nature and extent of the in-
juries which a person would have sustained absent some intervening
event, such as the malfunction of an automobile driver's head
restraint,' given the unique vulnerability of the human body to trauma
and the impossibility of fairly predicting the nature and measure of in-
jury which the body may suffer if trauma occurs. Those difficulties are
lessened substantially, however, when the hypothetical evidence goes to
the nature and extent of damage to property. Duly qualified experts,
without resort to farfetched speculation, should be able to testify on
the kind and extent of damage likely to result from the dropping of a
plank of a particular size, weight, and shape a specified distance into a
26. "It is easily seen that the probability of later death from existing causes for
which a defendant was not responsible would probably be an important element in fixing
damages, but it is not a defense:' McCahill v. New York Transportation Co., 201 N.Y. at
224, 94 N.E. at 617.
27. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Seidelson, The 402A Defendant
and the Negligent Actor, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 371, 393 (1977).
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ship's hold of particular structure and condition. Consequently, impos-
ing such evidentiary requirements on the plaintiff in Polemis does not
appear outrageous or unfair.
Another consequence of limiting the plaintiff's damages in Polemis
to the dollar value of the reasonably foreseeable damages arising out
of the defendant's culpability entails important substantive considera-
tions. Despite the fact that the defendant's conduct resulted in the
total loss of the plaintiff's ship, the plaintiff would be able to recover
only a fraction of that actual loss. Even if one considers that the
magnitude of the injury resulting from the defendant's carelessness
was unexpected, this limiting of the plaintiff's recovery appears unfair
at first blush.
Factually, it was the defendant's culpability which caused the total
loss of the ship. If one were to ask who should bear the economic
burden resulting from the unanticipated loss produced by the dropping
of the plank, innocent and injured plaintiff or culpable defendant, there
would be an understandable impulse to pin the loss on the defendant.
But it is here that the proximate cause requirement and its underlying
rationale come into play. If the defendant's conduct produced a reason-
ably foreseeable risk of only relatively minor damages to the planitiffs
ship, would not the imposition of liability on the defendant for the full
value of the ship produce liability wholly disproportionate to culpabili-
ty? More specifically, if the defendant's conduct created a reasonably
foreseeable risk of causing only a dent in a bulkhead, repairable at
minimal cost and not rendering the ship unusable even if not repaired,
the imposition of liability on the defendant for the full value of the ship
would frustrate the basic reason for the proximate cause requirement.
Therefore, so long as the proximate cause requirement exists to assure
that liability does not become wholly disproportionate to culpability,
the liability imposable on the defendant in Polemis could have been ap-
propriately limited to the reasonably foreseeable extent of damage to
the plaintiff's ship. The plaintiffs uncompensated loss, the difference
between reasonably foreseeable damage and total destruction of the
ship, seems precisely the kind of cost which plaintiffs should bear in
order to preserve the legal significance of proximate cause and its
principal rationale. Thus, where a defendant's negligence creates a
reasonably foreseeable risk of damage to a plaintiff's property, but a
risk of insubstantial property damage only, proximate cause should
preclude liability for any substantial property damage which far ex-
ceeds the extent of the foreseeable damage.
In Polemis, that conclusion is supported by various considerations.
The defendant's activity, off-loading cargo, is one with a relatively high
level of social utility. If that activity becomes economically prohibitive
as a result of the imposition of liability far exceeding reasonable expec-
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tations, society, as well as the defendant, will suffer. Moreover, an
analysis of the defendant's culpability in Polemis as a separate issue
from that of compensating the plaintiff for the loss of his ship reveals
that the level of culpability was relatively low. Assuming that the
defendant's conduct did not give rise to a reasonably foreseeable risk
of fire or of total or even substantial destruction of the ship, and con-
ceding that dropping the plank into the hold was culpable, if the most
which could be contemplated as a consequence of that conduct was a
dented bulkhead, liability for the total value of the ship would seem to
be wholly disproportionate to the culpability.
Suppose, however, there had been an employee of the stevedore in
the hold into which the plank was dropped.' It may be presumed that
the presence of a human being in the orbit of risk created by the
defendant's carelessness would enhance the relative degree of culpabil-
ity attributable to him where the employee's presence was reasonably
foreseeable. However, the further question of whether or not the
defendant should be liable for the full value of the ship is not suscepti-
ble of easy resolution.
In a situation where the culpability of a defendant is enhanced by
the reasonably foreseeable presence of an employee in the ship's hold,
the culpable conduct would then have created a reasonably foreseeable
risk of personal injury or death to the employee in addition to a
reasonably foreseeable risk of relatively minor property damage to the
ship. Mechanically, the question of holding a defendant liable to a plain-
tiff shipowner for the total loss of a ship can be posed in the following
fashion: If the defendant's conduct creates a reasonably foreseeable
risk of relatively minor property damage to the plaintiff and a reason-
ably foreseeable risk of personal injury or death to a third person,
should the defendant be liable in toto to the plaintiff if the defendant's
conduct results in the not reasonably foreseeable total loss of the plain-
tiff's property?
28. In fact, persons were present:
There were four or five of the Arab shore labourers in the lower hold filling the
slings which, when filled, were hove up by means of the winch situated on the up-
per deck to the 'tween decks level of the platform on which some of the Arabs in
the 'tween decks were working .... In the course of heaving a sling of the cases
from the hold the rope by which the sling was being raised or the sling itself came
into contact with the boards placed across the forward end of the hatch, causing
one of the boards to fall into the lower hold ....
Polemis, 3 K.B. at 562-63. For reasons stated in the text accompanying notes 28-32 infra,
the presence of the workers in the hold would justify imposing liability on the defendant
for the full value of the ship. The court, however, did not rest its opinion on the presence
of the endangered workers and the result achieved by the court traditionally has not been
explained on that ground. In the text, I have treated the Polemis result in the traditional
manner.
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In Palsgraf, Justice Cardozo set forth a different hypothetical which
may cast some light on the instant question:
A guard stumbles over a package which has been left upon a platform. It
seems to be a bundle of newspapers. It turns out to be a can of dynamite.
To the eye of ordinary vigilance, the bundle is abandoned waste, which
may be kicked or trod on with impunity. Is a passenger at the other end
of the platform protected by the law against the unsuspected hazard con-
cealed beneath the waste?'
Justice Cardozo's hypothetical involves a situation where there ex-
isted, at best, only a reasonably foreseeable risk of minor damage to
one person's property, but personal injury occurred to another in-
dividual. In the case where no foreseeable risk of personal injury ex-
isted, Justice Cardozo argued, the culpability of a defendant has not
reached an order of magnitude sufficient to justify recovery by a plain-
tiff undisclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance for the invasion of a
personal as opposed to a property interest. Justice Cardozo's hypothet-
ical, like the question posed by this article above, involves a "diver-
sity of interests"; the distinction between his hypothetical and our
question is that the latter involves a risk of personal injury which is
reasonably foreseeable. It is submitted that the difference in concerns;
ie., freedom from personal injury and freedom from property damage,
is not really significant when both risks are reasonably foreseeable
results of a defendant's culpable conduct. Moreover, it is legally in-
significant that the property owner and the threatened personal injury
victim are different individuals. If a defendant's culpable conduct
creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of damage, even minor, to a
plaintiff's property and a reasonably foreseeable risk of personal injury
or death to a third person, even though the latter does not eventuate,
the relative degree of culpability of that conduct is substantially
greater than it would have been absent any reasonably foreseeable
risk of injury to a third person.
The fortuitous avoidance of personal injury to a third person does
nothing to diminish the level of that culpability. Consequently, if that
culpable conduct results unexpectedly in the total destruction of a
plaintiff's property, holding a defendant liable for the total loss would
not result in the imposition of liability wholly disproportionate to
culpability.
Neither would it result in an inappropriate "windfall" to the plain-
tiff, who would merely be recovering for the actual damage he sus-
tained, viz., in Polemis, the loss of the ship. While that recovery would
be warranted by the real, although unrealized, risk of personal injury
to a third person, the recovery would not exceed the plaintiff's actual
29. 248 N.Y. at 342-43, 162 N.E. at 100.
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loss and would be related intimately to the enhanced culpability at-
tributable to the defendant. Absent the risk of personal injury to a
third person, a defendant would avoid liability for the total loss sus-
tained by a plaintiff under this formulation, because such liability
would be wholly disproportionate to his culpability. The risk of per-
sonal injury sufficiently enhances a defendant's culpability so that
liability for a plaintiffs entire property loss would no longer be wholly
disproportionate.
The question remains whether that conclusion is still acceptable if
the total property damage is exceptionally costly. In Polemis, the
damages imposed on the defendant were in the amount of £ 196,165 Is.
ld.0 Taking into account the date of the case, that would translate in-
to approximately $800,000. Damages in that amount, it is submitted,
would only be consistent with the basic reason for the proximate cause
requirement if the defendant's conduct, in addition to creating a
reasonably foreseeable risk of relatively minor damage to plaintiff's
ship, had created a reasonably foreseeable risk of personal injury or
death to a third person in the ship's hold. Because the reasonably
foreseeable risk of personal injury or death substantially enhances the
degree of culpability of a defendant's conduct, a higher degree of ac-
countability for property damage based on that conduct is analytically
acceptable.
Moreover, the dollar value of the personal injury or wrongful death
action is not the ceiling on a defendant's liability for destruction of a
plaintiffs personal property.3' For example, if in Polemis personal in-
jury or death had occurred but no action based on either of these had
been brought, and neither action would have been likely to produce an
$800,000 judgment, the plaintiff shipowner would still be permitted to
recover the full value of his ship. The proximate cause requirement
does not exist to ensure that liability will not exceed a precise dollar
value; it exists to ensure that liability will not become wholly dispropor-
tionate to a defendant's culpability. Where a defendant's conduct creates
a reasonably foreseeable risk of personal injury or death to a third person
as well as a-reasonably foreseeable risk of relatively minor damage to a
plaintiffs property, subjecting that defendant to liability for the total
actual loss of the plaintiffs property would not make the defendant
vulnerable to liability wholly disproportionate to culpability.
Suppose that the person in the hold were an employee of defendant
and, for that reason, incapable of securing any tort judgment against
30. 3 K.B. at 564.
31. If the mere risk of personal injury is sufficient to warrant a full recovery by the
plaintiff for the property damage sustained, then a priori the actual occurrence of per-
sonal injury in any amount would be more than enough reason to permit the plaintiff a
full recovery.
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him. Should that relationship preclude the imposition of liability on the
defendant for the total loss of the plaintiff's property? Even assuming that
the imperiled employee, if injured, would be limited to a rather restric-
tive workmen's compensation award, such legal constructs have no in-
herent mitigating effect on the culpability of the conduct attributable
to the defendant. The enhanced degree of that culpability arises out of the
reasonably foreseeable risk of personal injury or death to the human
being in the hold. That enhanced culpability subsists whether or not
the injured person has the legal capacity to secure a tort judgment
against the defendant.
In conclusion, if a defendant's culpable conduct creates a reasonably
foreseeable risk of relatively minor damage to a plaintiff's property
and a reasonably foreseeable risk of personal injury or death to a third
person, and that conduct results in the total loss of the plaintiff's prop-
erty, the defendant should be subjected to liability for that total loss,
whether or not the third person fortuitously avoids injury and without
regard to the difference in dollar value between the total property loss
and the potential personal injury or wrongful death action.32
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIABILITY AND THE TYPE OF DAMAGE
The Polemis. court's rejection of defendant's argument that liability
should not be imposed for damages of a type' not reasonably foresee-
able was itself repudiated in Wagon Mound L' There, because of the
defendant's negligence, furnace oil was discharged from a ship and
came in contact with the plaintiffs wharf. The oil was ignited, ap-
parently as the result of welding being performed on the wharf, and
the fire substantially destroyed the wharf. The court concluded that,
because the combustion of the oil was not reasonably foreseeable, the
defendant was not liable for the fire damage to the plaintiffs wharf.
Although the plaintiff was within the orbit of risk, it being reasonably
32. I would treat this situation as an exception to the general rule, see text accompa-
nying note 36 infra, that both the orbit of risk test (Palsgraf) and the general manner of
injury reasonably foreseeable test (Wagon Mound I and II; see notes 35-40 and accompa-
nying text infra) must be satisfied. Although the plaintiff property owner is within the or-
bit of risk, the manner of injury which occurred need not have been within the general
manner of injury reasonably foreseeable. The Wagon Mound test in this situation is inap-
plicable because: (1) the degree of culpability attributable to the defendant is substantially
enhanced as a result of the reasonably foreseeable risk of personal injury or death to the
third person and (2) the inherent limitation on the damages recoverable by the plaintiff
for a loss restricted to property eliminates any likelihood that liability will become wholly
disproportionate to culpability.
33. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
34. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co. (Wagon Mound 1),
[1961] A.C. 388 (N.S.W.).
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foreseeable that the oil would reach the wharf and adversely affect the
functioning of the wharf in a minimal way, the manner of injury which
in fact occurred, ie., conflagration, was not reasonably foreseeable. 5
For that reason, the defendant was not liable for the damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff. The result of combining Palsgraf and Wagon
Mound I, is a two-step proximate cause test. After adducing evidence
of the defendant's carelessness, the plaintiff's injury, and a factual
cause and effect relationship between the two,37 the plaintiff must offer
evidence sufficient to justify a reasonable factual finding that: (1) the
defendant's conduct created a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury of
some kind to the plaintiff (Palsgraf); and (2) the manner of injury which
occurred was within the general manner of injury reasonably foresee-
able (Wagon Mound 1). The second step is an appropriate requirement
to impose on the plaintiff in view of the principal reason for the prox-
imate cause requirement. Absent that burden, the defendant in Wagon
Mound I would have been liable for the fire damage to the plaintiff's
wharf and that liability, if one accepts the conclusion that the combus-
tion of the oil was not reasonably foreseeable, would have been wholly
disproportionate to the defendant's culpability.
Wagon Mound rP arose out of the same fact situation which pro-
duced Wagpn Mound I, but it differed in this regard: The plaintiffs, as
the owners of two ships damaged in the fire, ultimately recovered for
their property loss. The difference in result is probably attributable to
two factors noted by the court. First, the ship owners were not re-
quired to exercise the same circumspection as the wharfinger in
presenting evidence that the combustion of the oil had been reasonably
foreseeable. The welding on the wharf had certainly contributed to
that combustion, and from the perspective of the wharfinger, per-
suasive evidence that such a result was reasonably foreseeable would
have evidenced contributory negligence on the plaintiffs part. Free of
the fear of inculpating themselves, the ship owners presumably were
able to offer more persuasive evidence of the reasonable foreseeability
of fire. If that evidence were sufficient to justify a factual determina-
tion that the fire was reasonably foreseeable, subjecting the defendant
35. The court in Wagon Mound I stated:
The trial judge . . . made the all-important finding, which must be set out in his
own words: "The raison d'6tre of furnace oil is, of course, that it shall burn, but I
find the defendant did not know and could not reasonably be expected to have
known that it was capable of being set afire when spread on water."
Id. at 413.
36. See note 32 supra, noting an exception to this test.
37. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
38. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. Pty. (Wagon Mound II,
[1967] 1 A.C. 617 (N.S.W.).
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to liability for the fire loss would not contravene that aspect of prox-
imate cause which requires that the manner of injury which occurred
be within the general manner of injury reasonably foreseeable.
The second factor addressed by the court concerned the defendant's
relatively high degree of culpability, 9 since the discharge of the fur-
nace oil was contrary to the clear duty and interest of the defendant,
as well as the interest of the plaintiffs. It could have been avoided
without any additional expense, indeed its avoidance would have re-
sulted in a substantial savings, and with virtually no inconvenience to
the defendant.
Of course, defendant's conduct in Wagon Mound II could have been
no more culpable in fact than defendant's conduct in Wagon Mound I,
since precisely the same conduct was involved. Yet the language of the
court in Wagon Mound II emphasized the culpability of that conduct.
That emphasis does not necessarily imply judicial disingenuousness,"
39. Id. at 643, where the court noted the inexcusability of defendant's negligence:
In the present case there was no justification whatever for discharging the oil
into Sydney Harbour. Not only was it an offence to do so, but it involved con-
siderable loss financially. If the ship's engineer had thought about the matter, there
could have been no question of balancing the advantages and disadvantages. From
every point of view it was both his duty and his interest to stop the discharge im-
mediately.
Id.
40. See Kinsman I, 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964). The court stated:
The weight of authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages to con-
sequences foreseeable at the time of the negligent conduct when the consequences
are "direct," and the damage, although other and greater than expectable, is of the
same general sort that was risked. . . . [Indeed, we wonder whether the British
courts are not finding it necessary to limit the language of The Wagon Mound as
we have indicated.
Id. at 724-25 (Friendly, J.) (footnotes and citations omitted). See PROSSER, note 2 supra:
Six years later the Privy Council retreated somewhat from its position [taken in
Wagon Mound I] in Wagon Mound [II], where the action was for damage to ships
docked at the same wharf. This time there was evidence justifying the conclusion
that the defendants were, or should have been, aware that there was some slight
risk that the oil on the water would be ignited, although it was very unlikely. It
was held that since the conduct of the defendants had no justification or social
value, they were not justified in neglecting even that slight risk, and they were
therefore liable. The decision would appear to have adopted the American formula
of balancing magnitude of risk and gravity of harm against utility of conduct, and
to have applied it to foreseeability in relation to "proximate cause." The effect
would appear to be to let the Polemis Case in again by the back door, since cases
will obviously be quite infrequent in which there is not some recognizable slight
risk of this character.
Id. at 266 (footnotes omitted).
I believe that the opinion in Wagon Mound II, rather than "back-dooring" Wagon
Mound I, displays an appropriate sensitivity to the degree of culpability attributable to
the defendant and the relationship between that degree of culpability and the basic
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rather, it reflects the court's sensitivity to the significance of the
relative degree of culpability attributable to the defendant in resolving
a proximate cause issue. The easy and costless avoidance of the dis-
charge of the furnace oil, when conjoined with the reasonably foresee-
able consequence of fire, resulted in the Wagon Mound II court find-
ing the defendant sufficiently culpable to justify imposing liability for
the fire-damaged ships.
By taking some liberties with the facts of Wagon Mound I, the ef-
ficacy of the second test for proximate cause can be demonstrated, pro-
vided the first test (Palsgraj)" has been met. Assume that the furnace
oil created no reasonably foreseeable risk of fire, as was finally deter-
mined in that case, but that it did create a reasonably foreseeable risk
of coming in contact with the "slipways [of plaintiffs wharf] and con-
geal[ing] upon them [thus] interfer[ing] with [the] use of the slips." 2
Contrary to the actual facts of the case, further assume that it was
reasonably foreseeable that the interference with the use of the slip-
ways of the wharf would result in substantial loss to the wharf owner,
a loss approximately equal in dollar value to the cost to the wharf
owner of the fire damage to his property. In those circumstances,
should proximate cause preclude liability for the fire loss?
Based on the premise that it was reasonably foreseeable for the
escaping oil to contact the slipways so as to cause a substantial loss
from this interference with their use, had that type of damage in fact
occurred, the defendant undoubtedly would have been liable therefor.
If that loss would not have been substantially greater than the actual
fire loss, would subjecting the defendant to liability for the fire loss
have resulted in imposing a liability wholly disproportionate to
culpability? Presumably, it would not since the dollar value of the fire
loss did not substantially exceed the dollar value of the loss reasonably
foreseeable as a consequence of the defendant's negligence. Therefore,
it may be argued that the Wagon Mound test for proximate cause
should be rejected under circumstances where a defendant's conduct
creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial property damage,
and substantial property damage occurs, but in a different manner.
reason for the proximate cause requirement. Furthermore, there is little if any difference
between Judge Friendly's view that the damage be of "the same general sort that was
risked" and the conclusions achieved in the two Wagon Mound cases. In Wagon Mound II,
the court said, "the only question is whether a reasonable man having the knowledge and
experience to be expected of the chief engineer ... would have known that there was a
real risk of the oil on the water catching fire in some way . . .." 1 A.C. at 643 (emphasis
added). Obviously the court did not intend to require that the precise manner of injury
be reasonably foreseeable.
41. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
42. [1961] A.C. at 414.
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If the principal reason for the proximate cause requirement is to en-
sure a parity between liability and culpability, and in a particular case
the extent of liability for the actual loss would not substantially exceed
the extent of liability for the reasonably foreseeable loss of another
type, it seems appropriate to hold the defendant liable for the actual
loss. Are there reasons to forego such a straightforward conclusion?
It could be asserted that the imposition of liability for property
damage different in kind from the foreseeable loss, although not
greater in extent, might lead the defendant and others similarly
situated to be less conscientious and less careful in their future con-
duct. Although that imposition of liability would enlarge the scope of
potential liability - suggesting the need for greater conscientiousness
and carefulness - its imposition absent foreseeability of consequences
could induce persons to take an attitude of shoulder-shrugging and
resignation. If one faces potential liability for nonforeseeable conse-
quences, the incentive for exercising care to avoid the foreseeable ones
arguably is absent. The latter care is difficult enough; liability for the
former tends to frustrate any reasonable expectations and, for that
reason, to dissuade actors from the thoughtful exercise of care. That
criticism, stated from the perspective of potential defendants, an all-
encompasing class, could be elevated to a jurisprudential concern. For
example, it may be contended that holding defendants liable for non-
foreseeable consequences as well as foreseeable ones, insofar as the
dollar value of the former does not substantially exceed the dollar
value of the latter, would denigrate the concept of proximate cause to
the status of a fortuitous relationship between dollar values of dif-
ferent losses.
These concerns may be presumed to have significance, yet their ap-
preciation need not preclude liability for all nonforeseeable losses. The
resigned attitude of potential defendants can be guarded against by
limiting the imposition of liability for the nonforeseeable loss to those
circumstances in which that loss could have been prevented by the
same type of care which would have prevented the foreseeable loss.
Thus, in the above hypothetical,"3 the defendant would be subjected to
liability for nonforeseeable fire damage to the wharf because that
damage could have been prevented by the same conduct which would
have prevented the foreseeable and equally extensive loss caused by
the oil's interference with the slipways, viz., preventing the discharge
of the oil. Given that limitation, a defendant is likely to continue exer-
cising that care which would prevent the foreseeable loss, because the
same exercise of care would prevent liability for the unforeseeable
43. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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loss. Jurisprudentially, the conclusion as thus limited can be justified
by noting that it: (1) imposes no additional burden on the defendant in
terms of the cost of avoiding liability; (2) permits recovery by the in-
jured plaintiff for his actual loss when the extent of such recovery is
commensurate with the defendant's culpability; and (3) may enhance
the likelihood of the defendant's exercising that care which would
avoid both losses. Consequently, where a defendant's conduct creates a
reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial property damage and sub-
stantial property damage of a different sort occurs, proximate cause
should not preclude liability in those cases in which the actual damage
could have been prevented by the same type of care which would have
prevented the foreseeable loss.
This does not entail the complete rejection of the Wagon Mound prox-
imate cause requirement;" preserving that requirement would serve
an important purpose since it would be dispositive in a substantial
number of proximate cause cases. These cases would include those in
which a defendant's conduct did not create a reasonably foreseeable
risk of substantial property damage occurring in a manner different
from the actual property damage, but only a reasonably foreseeable
risk of minor property damage of a type different from the type of
minor property damage which actually occurred.
Imposing liability in a case such as our hypothetical ensures that a
direct relationship between the existence of proximate cause and the
culpability of the defendant will be maintained. If a defendant's con-
duct creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial damage to a
plaintiff's property, that conduct is more culpable than conduct which
creates only a reasonably foreseeable risk of minor damage to proper-
ty. A relatively high degree of culpability is inherently significant in
resolving a proximate cause issue, given the basic reason for the prox-
imate cause requirement. Where, as in the afore-mentioned
hypothetical, s the discharge of furnace oil creates a reasonably fore-
seeable risk of substantial damage to the plaintiff's property because
of its adverse and prolonged effect on the slipways, but the plain-
tiffs loss is occasioned by fire and does not significantly exceed
the reasonably foreseeable loss, the court should then see through the
random occurrence of type A damage instead of type B damage to the
culpability of the defendant's conduct itself.
A hypothetical situation, suggested by the Palsgraf case," which in-
volves personal injury rather than property damage poses a test for
this approach. To begin, assume that a passenger boarding a commer-
44. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
45. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
46. 248 N.Y. at 342-43, 162 N.E. at 100. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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cial airplane flight is carrying a crate marked TNT, and that the flight
attendant strongly insists that the crate may not be carried aboard.
Suppose the flight attendant carelessly causes the crate to fall from
the top of the boarding ladder to the runway below. Upon impact, the
crate shatters and the pekinese within runs out and bites the plaintiff,
who is standing 100 feet from the boarding ladder and waving good-
bye to a relative taking the flight. The plaintiff sues the defendant
airline company to recover for his injuries. The defendant's employee
was careless, the plaintiff was injured, and there was a factual cause
and effect relationship between carelessness and injury. How should
the proximate cause issue be resolved if the defendant moves for a
directed verdict?
Applying the two-step process suggested by Palsgraf and Wagon
Mound, 7 the court should grant the defendant's motion only if it con-
cludes that no reasonable jury could answer the two following ques-
tions affirmatively: Was the plaintiff within the orbit of risk? Was the
manner of injury which occurred within the general manner of injury
reasonably foreseeable? Given the TNT marking on the crate, it would
seem apparent that the negligence attributable to the defendant
created a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury of some kind to the
plaintiff, even though his position was some distance from the boarding
ladder. In considering the second question, and a reasonable jury's
capacity to answer it affirmatively, the court is almost certain to be in-
fluenced by the high level of culpability of the defendant's conduct.
The crate, after all, warned of TNT. Common sense virtually compels
the conclusion that subjecting the defendant to potential liability
would not generate liability incommensurate with culpability.
Presumably, then, the court would not fashion a description of the -
general manner of injury reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of
that culpable conduct so as to preclude the actual manner of injury.
Clearly, the court should deny the defendant's motion and submit the
case to the jury.
Retaining the same basic hypothetical, but substituting property
damage for personal injury, also presents an interesting result. Sup-
pose the pekinese bites a hole in the suitcase of a recently deplaned
passenger standing 100 feet from the boarding ladder. If the plaintiff
sues the defendant airline company to recover for that property loss
and the defendant moves for a directed verdict, the court should rule
against it. A jury could reasonably conclude that the culpable conduct
created a foreseeable risk of injury of some kind to the plaintiff and
that the manner of injury which occurred was within the general man-
ner of injury reasonably foreseeable from the release of the contents of
47. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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the crate. Of course, the fact that the culpable conduct created
reasonably foreseeable consequences, of personal injury and death as
well as property damage would alone justify that result under the
formulation suggested earlier herein. 8 Even setting aside the
reasonably foreseeable risks of personal injury and death, the result is
a rational one. The defendant's conduct created a reasonably foresee-
able risk of substantial property damage to all that property within
the foreseeable explosive range of the crate. The fact that only a suit-
case was damaged, and that by a dog, does not reduce the degree of
culpability, which ought to be judged at the time of the conduct at-
tributable to the defendant. Subjecting the defendant to potential
liability for the damaged suitcase certainly creates no risk of liability
wholly disproportionate to culpability. That conclusion supports the
proposition posited earlier'9 that if a defendant's negligence creates a
reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial damage to a plaintiffs prop-
erty, thereby satisfying the orbit of risk test, and substantial damage
to that property does in fact occur, although in a different manner, in
those cases in which the same type of care would have protected
against both risks, the court should envision the general manner of in-
jury reasonably foreseeable in flexible and broad enough terms so that
the actual injury would be encompassed in its view.
IV. CULPABILITY AND THE INTERVENING CAUSE
Another type of proximate cause problem invites examination
because, at least implicitly, judicial results in this category of cases are
susceptible of explanation in terms of the relative degree of culpabil-
ity. In Watson v. Kentucky and Indiana Bridge & Railroad,' the
defendant's alleged negligence caused the contents of a gasoline tank
car to run into a public street. Subsequently, a man named Duerr dropped
a lighted match into the gasoline vapor. The resulting explosion in-
jured the plaintiff, a bystander. There was conflicting evidence
whether Duerr's conduct was inadvertent or malicious. The court held
that if Duerr's conduct had been merely inadvertent or negligent, the
defendant could be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries. On the other
hand, if Duerr had "acted maliciously or with intent to cause the explo-
sion,"5' such conduct would be superseding so that the defendant could
not be held liable for the plaintiffs injuries. The court explained its
reason for imposing liability on the defendant in the case of an in-
tervening negligent act, and for failing to impose such liability in the
48. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
49. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
50. 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 (1910).
51. Id. at 630, 126 S.W. at 150.
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case of an intervening malicious act by a third party, by stating that
the former interference is foreseeable whereas the latter is not.52 In
essence, the court recognized that the act of an individual in negli-
gently or inadvertently lighting a match in the presence of gasoline
was a predictable event; therefore, the defendant who was responsible
for the escaping gas should be held accountable for the resulting explo-
sion and its consequences. The intentional lighting and throwing of a
match into the gasoline by an individual, on the other hand, was not a
normal response under the circumstances, and the defendant,
therefore, should not be held liable for the consequences of this in-
tervening act. While the result achieved by the court is thoroughly
commendable, its rationale that the defendant could have guarded
against a negligent but not an evil-minded defendant falls short.
Assuming that the defendant negligently caused the gasoline to be in a
public street, it would seem apparent that the plaintiff bystander
would be within the orbit of risk (Palsgraf) and that the manner of in-
jury which occurred (explosion) would be within the general manner of
injury reasonably foreseeable (Wagon Mound). Duerr's intervening act,
52. Id. at 632-33, 126 S.W. at 150-51. The court stated:
If the presence on Madison Street in the city of Louisville of the great volume
of loose gas that arose from the escaping gasoline was caused by the negligence of
the [defendant] Bridge & Railroad Company, it seems to us that the probable conse-
quence of its coming in contact with fire and causing an explosion was too plain a
proposition to admit of doubt. Indeed, it was most probable that some one would
strike a match to light a cigar or for other purposes in the midst of the gas. In our
opinion, therefore, the act of one lighting and throwing a match under such cir-
cumstances cannot be said to be the efficient cause of the explosion. It did not of
itself produce the explosion, nor could it have done so without the assistance and
contribution resulting from the primary negligence, if there was such negligence,
on the part of the ... Bridge & Railroad Company in furnishing the presence of the
gas in the street. This conclusion, however, rests upon the theory that Duerr in-
advertently or negligently lighted and threw the match in the gas. ...
If, however, the act of Duerr in lighting the match and throwing it into the
vapor or gas arising from the gasoline was malicious, and done for the purpose of
causing the explosion, we do not think [defendant] would be responsible, for while
the [defendant's] negligence may have been the efficient cause of the presence of
the gas in the street, and it should have understood enough of the consequences
thereof to have foreseen that an explosion was likely to result from the inadvertent
or negligent lighting of a match by some person who was ignorant of the presence
of the gas or of the effect of lighting or throwing a match in it, it could not have
foreseen or deemed it probable that one would maliciously or wantonly do such an
act for the evil purpose of producing the explosion. Therefore if the act of Duerr
was malicious . . . it was one which the [defendant] could not reasonably have an-
ticipated or guarded against, and in such case the act of Duerr, and not the primary
negligence of the [defendant] ... was the efficient or proximate cause of [plaintiff's]
injuries.
Vol. 19:1
Proximate Cause
whether negligent or intentional, did not enlarge either the orbit of
risk or the general manner of injury reasonably foreseeable.
Contrast Watson with Holloway v. Martin Oil Service, Inc.' The
defendant's employee sold one or two gallons of gasoline in a can to a
group of intoxicated young men who said their car had run out of gas."
The men then used the gasoline to commit arson. The object of their
crime was a dance hall which had earlier denied the men admission.
The plaintiffs, burned in the'dance hall fire, sought to recover for their
injuries from the defendant service station owner. The Court of Appeals
of Michigan affirmed the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion
for directed verdict.5 In Holloway, the intervening criminal act of ar-
son had a marked effect on the orbit of risk generated by the conduct
attributable to the defendant. Those injured in the dance hall fire cer-
tainly were not within the orbit of risk created by the original al-
legedly negligent act of selling gasoline to a group of intoxicated young
men who asserted that their car had run out of gas; no injury of any
kind to the dance hall patrons was reasonably foreseeable at the time
of the sale. In addition, the intervening act of arson probably resulted
in a manner of injury outside the general manner of injury reasonably
foreseeable. Since the injured plaintiffs were without the orbit of risk
as a matter of law and the manner of injury was without the general
manner of injury reasonably foreseeable, probably as a matter of law,
granting the defendant's motion for directed verdict was clearly cor-
rect.
In a hypothetical situation, however, suppose that after the sale of
the gasoline, the intoxicated young men had returned to their car,
poured the gasoline into the tank and driven off. Suppose further that
as a result of the driver's intoxication, the car then struck a pedes-
trian. Has the plaintiff pedestrian a legally sufficient case against the
53. 79 Mich. App. 475, 262 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1977).
54. In fact, the employee provided the gasoline only after an implicit threat had been
made. "[The employee] continued to refuse service until [one of the young men] 'started
putting his hand in his pocket' and asked 'are you going to put gas in there?"' Id. at 477,
262 N.W.2d at 859 (quoting the trial court). That coercion seems not to have been critical
to the court's opinion, although obviously it would make it more difficult to label the
employee's conduct negligent.
55. Id. at 482, 262 N.W.2d at 862.
56. The Holloway Court noted the distinction between the actual case and the
hypothetical suggested in the text:
Assuming the truth of the young men's story-that their car had run out of
gas-we hold that it should have been foreseen . . .that giving a group of intox-
icated individuals the means to propel a dangerous instrumentality (a motor vehi-
cle) is likely to result in personal injury and/or property damage as a result of the
use of the instrumentality. In other words, defendant would owe a duty to people
injured by the vehicle (either in other automobiles or in a pedestrian capacity) and
1980
Duquesne Law Review
defendant service station owner? In selling gasoline to a visibly intox-
icated group of young men who asserted that their car had run out of
gas, the defendant's employee may have been negligent and there
seems to be a factual cause and effect relationship between the
employee's negligence and the plaintiff's injury. With regard to the
question of whether the conduct attributable to the defendant was a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, a reasonable jury ould find
that the plaintiff was within the orbit of risk created by the
defendant's conduct. The circumstances of the sale should have implied
the likelihood of drunk driving. Similarly, a reasonable jury could con-
clude that the manner of injury which occurred was within the general
manner of injury reasonably foreseeable. Indeed, given the reasonable
foreseeability of drunk driving which a jury could find to resolve the
orbit of risk test affirmatively, the reasonable foreseeabiity of the
manner of injury would tend to follow automatically. Therefore, the
hypothetical differs from the actual Holloway case in two legally
significant ways. In Holloway, the trial judge could well conclude as a
matter of law that: (1) plaintiffs were not within the orbit of risk; and
(2) the manner of injury which occurred was not within the general
manner of injury reasonably foreseeable. In the case of the hypotheti-
cal, neither of those matter-of-law conclusions appears appropriate. In
those respects, Watson 7 would seem to resemble the hypothetical
more than it resembles the actual Holloway case. In Watson, plaintiff
was within the orbit of risk and the manner of injury which occurred
was within the general manner of injury reasonably foreseeable,
whether Duerr acted negligently or intentionally.
It is also noteworthy that the conduct of the defendant service sta-
tion employee was the same whether it took place in the context of the
Holloway case or the hypothetical; therefore, the culpability and social
utility" of that conduct remain constant regardless of whether the
property damage caused by the vehicle. Here, however, the vehicle did not cause
the injury. To hold that [defendant is] liable for injuries stemming from an arson,
on these facts-where there is no testimony to indicate that [defendant] should
have been aware that an arson was planned-would effectively end the practice of
selling gasoline in containers, for use in emergencies and for other uses.
Id. at 480-81, 262 N.W.2d at 861 (emphasis in original).
57. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
58. In Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977), 11 year-old Joseph
Alfono bought two 10-cent slingshots and gave one to 12 year-old Royal Moning. A pellet
from Joseph's slingshot struck Royal in the eye, causing the loss of sight in that eye. The
plaintiff sued the slingshot manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer, asserting that the
marketing of slingshots directly to children was negligent. The trial court directed a ver-
dict for the defendants. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed and remanded for new
trial, concluding that "[t]he resolution of the balance between the utility of children having
ready-market access to slingshots and the risk of harm thereby created is an aspect of the
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plaintiffs injuries resulted from arson or drunk driving. Similarly in
Watson, the social utility and culpability of the defendant's conduct re-
main constant whether Duerr acted negligently or intentionally; pre-
cisely the same conduct on the part of the defendant existed. Why
then in Watson should Duerr's conduct, if intentional, be deemed
superseding even though it neither enlarged the orbit of risk nor the
general manner of injury reasonably foreseeable?
One additional distinction between Holloway and the hypothetical"
is that in Holloway, the intervening act of arson entailed overwhelm-
ing culpability of a criminal nature involving the intention to cause
personal injury or property damage or both. In the hypothetical,
however, the intervening act was drunk driving. While deplorable, ob-
viously culpable, and even criminal, 0 that conduct was not done with
the intention of causing personal injury or property damage. Given the
overwhelming culpability of the intervening act in Holloway, judicial
sensibilities probably would be offended by the imposition of liability
on the merely negligent defendant for consequences contributed to by
the arson. However, given the less culpable intervening act in the
hypothetical, judicial sensibilities probably would not be offended by
the imposition of liability on the merely negligent defendant for conse-
quences contributed to by the drunk driving.
It is precisely that kind of judicial sensitivity to the relative degree
of culpability of the intervening act which explains the result in Wat-
son. If Duerr's act of dropping a lighted match into the gasoline vapor
was done with the intention of causing an explosion, judicial sen-
sibilities would be offended by the imposition of liability on the merely
negligent defendant for consequences contributed to by that over-
whelmingly culpable intervening act, despite the fact that the plaintiff
may have been within the orbit of risk created by the defendant's
negligence and that the manner of injury was within the general man-
ner of injury reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant's
determination of the reasonableness of that risk and of the defendants' conduct, and
should be decided by a jury .... " Id. at 434, 254 N.W.2d at 763. The contrary result in
Holloway reflects, in part, the court's sensitivity to the different levels of social utility of
defendants' conduct in the two cases. Marketing slingshots directly to children
presumably has a significantly lower level of utility than "selling gasoline in containers,
for use in emergencies and for other proper uses." 79 Mich. App. at 481, 262 N.W.2d at
861.
59. See text accompanying note 56,supra.
60. See, e.g., MIcH STAT. ANN. § 9.2325(a), (c), (d) (Supp. 1980):
It shall be unlawful and punishable [by imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or
a fine of not less than $50.00 nor more than $100.00 or both and by suspension of
operator's license for a period of not more than 2 years]... for a person.., who is
under the influence of intoxicating liquor.., to drive a vehicle upon a highway or
other place open to the general public ... within this state.
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negligence. If, on the other hand, Duerr's act was done inadvertently
or negligently, a court would hardly find it difficult to impose liability
on the negligent defendant for consequences contributed to by the in-
tervening negligent act, in circumstances where the plaintiff was
within the orbit of risk created by the defendant's conduct and the
manner of injury which occurred was within the general manner of in-
jury reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant's conduct. Con-
sequently, the result in Watson is explicable in terms of a judicial sen-
sitivity to the relative degree of culpability of the defendant's conduct,
the relative degree of culpability of the intervening act, and the rel-
tionship between those two degrees of culpability.
Suppose that, in Holloway, the intoxicated young men purchasing
the gasoline from the defendant's employee had said, "Fill the can.
We've got a dance hall to torch." How would that affect the legal suffi-
ciency of the plaintiffs' case against the defendant? Rather clearly, that
hypothetical language would tend to bring the plaintiffs within the or-
bit of risk and the manner of injury within the general manner of in-
jury reasonably foreseeable. Given that language, it is doubtful that
the trial court would have been willing to answer in the negative
either the orbit of risk or general manner of injury reasonably foresee-
able question as a matter of law. Moreover, that language tends to
enhance substantially the relative degree of culpability of the conduct
attributable to the defendant. Arguably, the enhancement of culpabili-
ty is sufficiently significant that judicial sensibilities would not likely
be offended by exposing the defendant to liability for consequences
contributed to even by an intervening act of arson.
In Underwood v. United States,"' the decedent was shot and killed
by her former husband. A wrongful death action was brought pursuant
to the Federal Torts Claim Act.2 Airman Dunn, recently divorced from
his wife, had received psychiatric treatment at a base hospital in Mont-
gomery, Alabama."3 During the course of treatment, it was determined
that Dunn's problems were intimately related to the divorce and his feel-
ings toward his former wife and their three children. In addition, it
was determined that Dunn had the potential of injuring himself or his
former wife." Dunn was returned to duty with the Air Police Squadron
without any recommended restrictions. In violation of Air Force Regu-
lations, Dunn was permitted to obtain the use of a .45 caliber
automatic pistol and ammunition without proper military authorization
61. 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
62. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
63. 356 F.2d at 94.
64. Id. at 96.
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and supervision.65 Dunn used the gun to kill his former wife at her
place of employment in Montgomery."
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the negligence of certain Air Force
personnel was a proximate cause of the decedent's death. Based upon
the information available to the defendant's agents, the decedent was
found to be within the orbit of risk created by their negligence and the
manner of injury (homicide) was determined to be within the general
manner of injury reasonably foreseeable as a result of that negligence.
Although homicide is the ultimate culpable intervening act, the court
was not hard-pressed to find the negligent defendant liable for the
decedent's death because its culpability had been significantly en-
hanced by its knowledgeable position in reference to Dunn's volatile
condition. 7
Consequently, a court presented with a proximate cause issue in a
case involving an intervening criminal act should be considerate of two
important questions: (1) Did the intervening act enlarge either the or-
bit of risk or the general manner of injury reasonably foreseeable;
and (2) what was the relationship between the relative degree of
culpability attributable to the defendant and the relative degree of
culpability attributable to the intervening actor? If the intervening
criminal act did not enlarge either the orbit of risk or the general man-
ner of injury reasonably foreseeable, it should not be deemed supersed-
ing unless, when compared to the culpability attributable to the defend-
ant, it was of such overwhelming culpability that it tends, on balance,
to exonerate the negligent defendant.
V. CULPABILITY AND PURELY ECONOMIC LOSSES
Judicial sensibilities also seem to be offended by the prospect of im-
posing liability on the merely negligent actor in cases in which the
plaintiff's injury consists of purely economic loss. Petition of Kinsman
Transit Co. provides an ideal context in which to examine that judicial
reaction because the same operative facts gave rise to two cases, one
involving damage to property 8 and the other involving purely economic
losses.69 Due to negligence attributable to Kinsman Transit Com-
pany (ship owner) and Continental Grain Company (dock owner), the
S.S. MacGilvray Shiras slipped her moorings and traveled downstream
where she collided with the S.S. Michael Tewksbury. That impact caused
65. Id. at 98.
66. Id. at 94.
67. Id. at 99.
68. Petition of Kinsman Transport Co. (Kinsman 1), 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964), cerL
denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
69. Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman I), 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
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the Tewksbury to slip her moorings and the two ships continued
downstream toward the Michigan Avenue Bridge. Despite phone calls
urging that the bridge be raised so that the ships would not strike it,
the employees of the City of Buffalo failed to raise the bridge in time.
The Tewksbury struck the bridge so that its south tower collapsed.
The two ships and the downed portion of the bridge dammed the flow
of the river, causing flooding on adjacent land upstream as far as the
Continental dock, some three miles from the bridge. In Kinsman I,
owners of the flooded properties sought damages from Kinsman, Con-
tinental, and the City of Buffalo. Judge Friendly found such liability to
be appropriate, concluding, in effect, that the claimants were within the
orbit of risk created by the defendants' negligence and that the manner of
injury which occurred was within the general manner of injury reason-
ably foreseeable."
In Kinsman II, ' the claimants were Cargill, Incorporated and Cargo
Carriers, Incorporated. At the time of the ship's collision, Cargill had
stored several hundred thousand bushels of wheat aboard another ship
berthed in the harbor. However, as a result of the accident, the vessel
could not be moved to grain elevators above the bridge for unloading.
Consequently, Cargill was required to secure replacement wheat from
another source in order for it to comply with its contractual obliga-
tions. Cargill sought damages for the extra transportation costs in the
amount of $30,231.38, and for increased storage costs in the amount of
70. 338 F.2d at 724. Judge Friendly offered this statement of the background facts of
the case:
The Buffalo River flows through Buffalo from east to west, with many turns and
bends, until it empties into Lake Erie. Its navigable western portion is lined with
docks, grain elevators, and industrial installations; during the winter, lake vessels
tie up there pending resumption of navigation of the Great Lakes, without power
and with only a shipkeeper aboard. About a mile from the mouth, the City of Buf-
falo maintains a lift bridge at Michigan Avenue. Thaws and rain frequently cause
freshets to develop in the upper part of the river and its tributary, Cazenovia
Creek; currents then range up to fifteen miles an hour and propel broken ice down
the river, which sometimes overflows its banks.
On January 21, 1959, rain and thaw followed a period of freezing weather. The
United States Weather Bureau issued appropriate warnings which were published
and broadcast. Around 6 P.M. an ice jam that had formed in Cazenovia Creek
disintegrated. Another ice jam formed just west of the junction of the creek and
the river; it broke loose around 9 P.M.
Id. at 711-12. This very statement of the facts illustrates that an enhanced degree of
culpability could be attributed to the three defendants, which the court did:
We . . . hold that where, as here, the damages resulted from the same physical
forces whose existence required the exercise of greater care than was displayed
and were of the same general sort that was expectable, unforeseeability of the ex-
act developments and of the extent of the loss will not limit liability.
Id. at 726.
71. 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
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$8,232.72 Also because of the catastrophe on the river, Cargo Carriers
could not unload a shipment of corn from a cargo vessel when it was
broken loose from its moorings by oine of the free-floating ships. Subse-
quently, an ice block formed between the vessel and the dock where
the grain elevators were located. Since Cargo Carriers was under con-
tract to transfer the corn, and the harbor tugs were prevented from
breaking up the ice jam by the collapsed bridge, Cargo was required to
unload the cargo of corn by using specially rented equipment. Cargo,
consequently, sought an award in the amount of $1,590.40 for incurred
expenses.73
The district court denied the claims of both, "reason[ing] that.., the
damages to Cargill and Cargo Carriers were caused by negligent in-
terference with their contractual relations. In the absence of proof that
the interference was intentional or with knowledge of the existence of
the contracts [the district court] concluded recovery could not be
grounded in tort."'
Judge Kaufman, writing for the Second Circuit, "prefer[red] to leave
the rock-strewn path of 'negligent interference with contract' for more
familiar tort terrain. Cargill and Cargo Carriers argue broadly that
they suffered damage as a result of defendants' negligence and we will
deal with their claims in these terms instead of the more esoteric
'negligent interference' ground. 17 5 Although Judge Kaufman, too,
denied the claims, he did so because the injuries to Cargill and Cargo
Carriers were too remote or indirect a consequence of the defendants'
negligence.7
That conclusion, viewed against the backdrop of Kinsman I, creates
a certain awkwardness, a feeling of at least uneven, if not inconsistent,
conclusions. Apparently, Judge Kaufman was aware of that seeming
awkwardness, 7 yet he did not permit recovery by Cargill and Cargo
72. Id. at 823.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 824.
76. Id.
77. Judge Kaufman found it necessary to admit the following:
When the instant case was last here, we held-although without discussion of
the Cargill and Cargo Carriers claims-that it was a foreseeable consequence of the
negligence of the City of Buffalo and Kinsman Transit Company that the river
would be dammed. It would seem to follow from this that it was foreseeable that
transportation on the river would be disrupted and that some would incur expenses
because of the need to find alternative routes of transportation or substitutes for
goods delayed by the disaster. It may be that the specific manner was not
foreseeable in which the damages to Cargill and Cargo Carriers would be incurred
but such strict foreseeability-which in practice would rarely exist except in hind-
sight-has not been required.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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Carriers. Judge Kaufman's ultimate answer was a reversion to the
practical politics concept found in Judge Andrews' dissenting opinion
in Palsgraf.78 The same difficulty with that approach noted earlier 9
also applies here because a trial or appellate judge confronted with a
proximate cause issue faces the dilemma of determining the proper ap-
plication of the practical politics language to a particular set of facts.
In other words, how can the subjective impression of expediency con-
stitute a rule capable of rational application so that the diverging
results in the two Kinsman cases are actually consistent?
The dissatisfaction with the court's analysis in Kinsman II exists
because both the level of social utility of the defendants' conduct and
the degree of culpability attributable to that conduct in Kinsman II are
precisely the same as in Kinsman I. In terms of the Palsgraf test,0 the
claimants in Kinsman II, as users of the river in the immediate area of
the calamity, were apparently within the orbit of risk. In terms of the
Wagon Mound test, given the Kinsman I finding that the damming of
the river was reasonably foreseeable, and the Kinsman I and II finding
that the precise manner of injury need not be foreseeable, the inac-
cessibility of cargo was an injury sustained by Cargill and Cargo Car-
riers which was within the general manner of injury reasonably
foreseeable. The difference in results between the two Kinsman cases
must, therefore, derive from another source.
The most obvious distinction between Kinsman I and II is in the
nature of losses suffered. The claimants in Kinsman I suffered damage
to their property; the claimants in Kinsman II sustained purely
economic losses. There exists a traditional reluctance on the part of
courts to subject a negligent actor to potential liability for purely
economic loss,81 which may be explained by the sometimes tacit con-
78. Id. at 825. Judge Kaufman quoted the "practical politics" language of Judge An-
drews' dissenting opinion in Palsgraf which, he noted, had previously been referred to by
Judge Friendly in Kinsman L See note 10 supra.
79. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
80. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
81. See PROSSER, note 2 supra for a discussion of interference with contractual rela-
tions:
No very satisfactory reason has been given for this refusal of a remedy in
negligence cases. For the most part the courts have talked of "proximate cause,"
and have said that the consequences were too "remote." In all of the cases denying
recovery the defendant had no knowledge of the contractual relation and no reason
to foresee any harm to the plaintiff's interests; and this has led some writers to
conclude that they do not mean that no negligence action could ever be maintained,
but merely that there was no duty to the plaintiff in the particular instance. While
this is very persuasive, it seems more likely that the courts are deliberately refus-
ing to protect any contract against negligence, influenced by fear of an undue
burden on freedom of action, the relative severity of the penalty which may be im-
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cern that such liability may turn out to be wholly disproportionate to
culpability, given the potentially enormous amounts of money involved
in economic losses and the difficulty of anticipating all those who might
sustain such purely economic losses. 2 To impose liability potentially in
the millions of dollars on a negligent defendant who had no reason to
contemplate that his culpability could generate such staggering conse-
quences might well frustrate the basic reason for the proximate cause
requirement. It is important, therefore, to determine if that concern
would be well based in Kinsman I.
Both Kinsman (owner of the Shiras) and Continental (owner of the
dock) were active commercial users of the river, each having a pre-
sumptive knowledge of the commercial use of the river made by
others. The City of Buffalo (owner and operator of the drawbridge) cer-
tainly had presumptive knowledge of the commercial use made of the
river. It would seem uncommonly awkward to assert on behalf of any
of those culpable actors that the purely economic losses sustained by
Cargill and Cargo Carriers were of a type beyond reasonable con-
templation. Consequently, the imposition of liability on the defendants
for the economic losses sustained by the claimants would hardly result
in liability beyond reasonably foreseeable consequences. This strongly
implies that such liability would not be incommensurate with culpabil-
ity. Thus, we have concluded that in Kinsman I and Kinsman II: (a) the
level of social utility of defendants' conduct was identical; (b) the
degree of culpability attributable to that conduct was identical; (c)
claimants were within the orbit of risk; (d) the manner of injury was
within the general manner of injury reasonably foreseeable; and (e) the
imposition of the liability sought by claimants would not be wholly
disproportionate to defendants' culpability. All of this signifies that de-
nying recovery to the claimants in Kinsman H was improper even
though their losses were purely economic ones.
That observation is supported by Union Oil Co. v. Oppen. The
plaintiffs, commercial fisherman, sued to recover damages for lost
profits occasioned by an oil spill emanating from an off-shore well
operated by the defendants. The parties entered into a stipulation
which provided, in part, that the defendants would pay the plaintiffs
posed upon mere negligence, the possibility of collusive claims and increased litiga-
tion and the difficulty of apportioning damages. If this is true, the question may at
least be raised whether such a policy is not too narrow, and whether, as in the
somewhat analogous case of the liability of the contractor himself to third parties,
the law may not be expected to move in the future in the direction of recovery by
those whose damages are foreseeable by the actor.
Id. at 940 (footnotes omitted).
82. See Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005
(1978).
83. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
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any damages not exceeding those which would have been paid under
circumstances of defendants' negligence." The defendants then moved
for partial summary judgment, seeking "to eliminate . . . any element
of damages consisting of profits lost as a result of the reduction in the
commercial fishing potential [of the polluted water].""5 That raised the
issue of whether the negligent defendants could be held liable for pure-
ly economic losses sustained by the plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit
answered affirmatively.
Noting that "[b]oth the plaintiffs and defendants conduct their
business operations away from land and in, on and under the sea,"' the
court concluded that "the defendants could reasonably have foreseen
that negligently conducted drilling operations might diminish aquatic
life and thus injure the business of commercial fisherman."' In
essence, the court found that the plaintiffs were within the orbit of
risk and that the manner of injury was within the general manner of
injury reasonably foreseeable. Moreover, even though the plaintiffs'
loss was purely economic in nature, the imposition of liability for that
loss would not result in liability beyond the reasonable contemplation
of the defendants, given the relationship between the commercial ac-
tivities of the plaintiffs and defendants. Apparently, in the court's
view, such liability would not be wholly disproportionate to the defend-
ants' culpability.
The judicial approach utilized in Oppen is noteworthy because it
demonstrates an awareness of the Palsgraf and Wagon Mound tests"
84. Id. at 560.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 570.
87. Id. at 569. It would be incorrect to dismiss the result in Oppen as one at-
tributable to admiralty law in view of the court's own assessment of the scope of its in-
quiry:
We are . . . not driven to the choice between maritime law and the law of
California. So far as our research reveals, neither forum has made a definitive rul-
ing on the precise issue before us. As a consequence, it has become necessary for
us to examine a fairly large body of authorities, drawn from numerous jurisdictions
and secondary sources, in order to reach what we regard as the proper resolution
of this dispute. In that the same authorities and sources must be examined and
evaluated without regard to whether this process is characterized as an examina-
tion of admirality law or the law of California, we are convinced that under either
body of law the actions of the special masters and the district judge in denying
defendants' motion for partial summary judgment were correct.
In any event, we shall proceed in a manner that we believe is faithful to the
spirit of California tort law in disposing of the issue before us. For this reason we
are content to say that for purposes of this case we regard it as irrelevant whether
our efforts are designated an exposition of admiralty law or the law of California.
Id. at 562-63. See also id. at 571 (Ely, J., concurring).
88. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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plus the court's awareness that special stress may be applied to those
tests when recovery for purely economic loss is sought. The court,
moreover, did not simply revert to "practical politics" or state a
mechanical rule such as "the merely negligent actor may not be liable
for purely economic loss" in order to make an easy disposition of the
case. Rather, it recognized that reasonable foreseeability of such
economic losses was the touchstone of intelligent resolution and that
reasonable foreseeability necessarily required an examination of the
relationship, if any, which existed between the defendants' conduct and
the plaintiffs' commercial activities.
In a later case a court denied recovery for purely economic loss from
a negligent actor, yet gave additional indication of a growing judicial
sensitivity to the significance of the relationship between defendant's
conduct and plaintiff's commercial activity. In Just's, Inc. v. Arrington
Construction Co., 9 a lessee-business sought damages from a contractor
for economic loss occasioned by the contractor's alleged negligence in
performing a city-awarded contract for the renovation of a downtown
business district. The negligence alleged was "failure to complete the
project in a timely manner and to provide continuous access to plain-
tiff's business as required by the terms of the contract."' The
plaintiff's business was within the renovation district. In denying such
damages to the plaintiff, the court said:
This plaintiff is surely not the only person who may have suffered some
pecuniary losses as a result of the downtown renovation project. For ex-
ample, others who may have suffered pecuniary losses could conceivably
include not only all the other businesses in the area, but also their sup-
pliers, creditors, and so forth, ad infinitum. In contrast to the recognized
liability for personal injuries and property damage, with its inherent
limitations of size, parties and time, liability for all the economic repercus-
sions of a negligent act would be virtually open-ended.... If the defend-
ant's liability were extended to all those who suffered any pecuniary loss,
its liability could become grossly disproportionate to its fault. Such poten-
tial liability would unduly burden any construction in a business area.
However, there are exceptions to this rule against the recovery of
purely economic losses, and the rule need not be applied mechanically.
But such exceptions generally involve a special relationship between the
parties ... or unique circumstances requiring a different allocation of risk.
See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen ... (commercial fishing grounds damaged by
negligent oil spill). However neither situation is present in this case."
In addition to evidencing sensitivity to the relationship between the
parties, the court's excerpted language identifies the basic reason for
the proximate cause requirement propounded in this article. The court
89. 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978).
90. Id. at 463, 583 P.2d at 998.
91. Id. at 470, 583 P.2d at 1005 (citations omitted).
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further recognized the intimately related concern that, if that reason is
ignored in a case in which defendant's conduct enjoys a relatively high
level of social utility, society may be harmed as a result of unduly in-
hibiting the renovation of business districts. Exposing the allegedly
negligent contractor to potential liability for economic losses sustained
by the suppliers and creditors of businesses within the renovation
district could frustrate the purpose of the proximate cause require-
ment and make future renovation projects economically prohibitive.
Despite this reasoning, further analysis of the case is required before
its refusal to compensate the plaintiff is commended.
Assume that the evidence offered by the plaintiff would justify fac-
tual conclusions that: (1) the defendant was negligent; (2) the plaintiff
was injured economically; and (3) a factual cause and effect relationship
existed between negligence and injury. Could a reasonable jury find
that the plaintiff was within the orbit of risk created by the
defendant's negligence in fulfilling the renovation contract? Presum-
ably so since the plaintiff's business was within the business district
under renovation and the defendant's negligence created a reasonably
foreseeable risk of some kind of injury to the plaintiff. Could a
reasonable jury find that the manner of injury, namely, the loss of
business resulting from "failure to complete the project in a timely
manner and to provide continuous access to plaintiff's business as re-
quired by the terms of the contract,"92 was within the general manner
of injury reasonably foreseeable? Merely to state the question impels
an affirmative answer. Given the relationship between the defendant's
conduct, renovating a business district, and the nature of the plaintiff's
commercial activity, operating a business within the district under
renovation, the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff is well within
the bounds of the defendant's reasonable contemplation.93 Concerning
92. Id at 463, 583 P.2d at 998. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
93. Ironically, the court in Just's concluded that the plaintiff could recover for its
economic loss as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the defendant and the
city. The test which must be satisfied before a third party may enforce the terms of a con-
tract between a private contractor and a public body was clearly set forth in Stewart v.
Arrington Const. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895 (1968):
In order to recover as a third party beneficiary, it is not necessary that the in-
dividual be named and identified as an individual although that is usually sufficient;
a third party may enforce a contract if he can show he is a member of a limited
class for whose benefit it was made .... The class may be limited either by a nar-
row description of the injuries to be guarded against and the damages to be paid ... or
by a similar description of the class to be protected.
Id. at 532, 446 P.2d at 901 (citations omitted). Application of this test to the facts of Just's
raises two issues: (1) Was the contract between the City of Idaho Falls and the defendant,
particularly the provisions requiring the defendant to take specified measures to lessen
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the hypothetical claimants who worried the court, such as suppliers
and creditors of businesses within the area, a court could intelligently
conclude that those hypothetical claimants were without the orbit of
risk as a matter of law and, therefore, unable to recover purely
economic losses from the defendant. 4 Consequently, while the court's
continuing sensitivity to the basic reason for the proximate cause re-
quirement and inherently related factors is to be applauded, its
matter-of-law determination that the defendant's alleged negligence
was not a proximate cause of the particular plaintiffs economic loss
was the product of an overly broad application of that reason and
those factors. More succinctly, the court failed to attach appropriate
significance to the "special relationship" between the parties.
In Berg v. General Motors Corp.,5 the plaintiff, a commercial fisher-
man, purchased a new boat which had been manufactured by the defend-
ant. Because of allegedly negligent manufacture, the boat broke down
during the fishing season. The plaintiff sought recovery for the an-
ticipated value of the lost fish catch. The Supreme Court of Washing-
ton framed the legal issue as one involving purely economic loss." The
court arrived at its decision to compensate the plaintiff because the
relationship which existed between the defendant manufacturer and
the plaintiff purchaser was one which brought the economic loss sus-
the disruption to the business in the area, for the benefit of a limited class? (2) If so, is the
plaintiff a member of that class? The Just's court answered both those questions affir-
matively, 99 Idaho at 464, 583 P.2d at 999, and in the process practically demonstrated
that the plaintiff was within the orbit of risk generated by the defendant's conduct, that
the manner of injury which occurred was within the general manner of injury reasonably
foreseeable as a consequence of the defendant's conduct and that the plaintiff's economic
loss was within the reasonable contemplation of the defendant as a consequence of the
defendant's conduct.
94. Although the court in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974), con-
cluded that the economic losses sustained by the commercial fisherman constituted legally
cognizable damages, it was also careful to discourage other claimants who may have sus-
tained economic losses:
Finally, it must be understood that our holding in this case does not open the
door to claims that may be asserted by those, other than commercial fishermen,
whose economic or personal affairs were discommoded by the oil spill of January
28, 1969. The general rule urged upon us by defendants has a legitimate sphere
within which to operate. Nothing said in this opinion is intended to suggest, for ex-
ample, that every decline in the general commercial activity of every business in
the Santa Barbara area following the occurrences of 1969 constitutes a legally
cognizable injury for which the defendants may be responsible.
Id. at 570.
95. 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976).
96. Id. at 585, 555 P.2d 818, where the court stated: "This appeal involves the single
issue of whether the law of negligence permits recovery by a purchaser of goods against a
manufacturer for damages constituting solely economic loss as distinguished from damage
to person or property?"
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tained by the plaintiff within the reasonable contemplation of the
defendant. 7
If the plaintiff is within the orbit of risk generated by the defend-
ant's negligence (Palsgra)D" and if the manner of injury is within the
general manner of injury reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of
the defendant's negligence (Wagon Mound)," that negligence should be
deemed to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Where the
plaintiff's injury consists of a purely economic loss, resolution of the
Palsgraf and Wagon Mound"' tests is likely to be facilitated enor-
mously by examining the relationship, if any, which existed between
the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's commercial activity for the
purpose of determining if the plaintiffs economic loss was within the
reasonable contemplation of the defendant. This analysis was applied
in Oppen"' and Berg"O2 and also should have been applied in Kinsman11.103
Moreover, in order to assure a continuing judicial awareness of the
significance of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant
in those cases in which a plaintiff seeks damages for purely economic
loss from a negligent defendant, it might well be appropriate for the
court to articulate a third test in addition to the Palsgraf-Wagon
Mound"1' tests: Given the relationship between the defendant's conduct
and the plaintiff's commercial activity, could a reasonable jury find
that the plaintiff's economic loss was within the reasonable contempla-
tion of the defendant? In the Berg"' case, the defendant and the plain-
tiff were at opposite ends of a distributive chain; the defendant
97. The court characterized the special relationship between the defendant and the
plaintiff as one which permitted the plaintiff recovery for his purely economic loss:
"Foreseeability" and a duty to the complaining party must be proved . . .. The
scope of the duty owed is measured by the foreseeability of the risk, and whether
the danger created by that risk is sufficiently large to embrace the specific harm
alleged to have occurred .... A manufacturer intending and foreseeing that its
product would eventually be purchased by persons operating commercial ventures,
owes such persons the duty not to impair that purchaser's commercial operations
by a faulty product. The negligent manufacture of such an article sold, poses the
foreseeable risk that the output of the entire enterprise would be diminished or
even temporarily halted. The specie of harm generated by such work stoppage (lost
profits) is well within the zone of danger created and foreseen by the negligent act.
Id. at 592-93, 555 P.2d at 822-23 (citations omitted).
98. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See text accompanying note 8 supra.
99. [1961] A.C. 388 (N.S.W.). See text accompanying note 34 supra.
100. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
101. 501 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying note 83 supra.
102. 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976). See text accompanying note 95 supra.
103. 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). See text accompanying note 71 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
105. 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976). See text accompanying note 95 supra.
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manufactured the fishing boat and the plaintiff purchased the boat for
commercial fishing. In those circumstances, an examination of the rela-
tionship between plaintiff and defendant virtually compels the conclu-
sion that the plaintiffs commercial loss was within the reasonable con-
templation of the defendant. In Oppen,'" defendants and plaintiffs
were engaged in separate commercial enterprises each of which had an
intimate relationship with the immediate marine environment. When
the defendants' conduct violated that environment, the plaintiffs' com-
mercial loss undoubtedly was within the reasonable contemplation of
the defendants. Similarly, in Kinsman 11,107 defendants and plaintiffs
were engaged in separate commercial or governmental enterprises
each of which had an intimate relationship with the navigable waters
of the Buffalo River. When the defendants' conduct temporarily ter-
minated the navigability of the river, it would seem that the plaintiffs'
commercial loss would be within the reasonable contemplation of the
defendants. In Just's,'8 the defendant's commercial activity (renovation
of the downtown business district) was in geographical proximity to,
and was intended to affect the profitability of, the plaintiff's commer-
cial activity. Given that relationship, it follows that a reasonable jury
could have concluded that the plaintiffs commercial loss was within
the reasonable contemplation of the defendant at the time of the
defendant's allegedly negligent conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset,' 9 a dictionary definition of proximate cause
is unlikely to be of meaningful assistance to a court confronted with a
proximate cause issue. Intelligent resolution of that issue requires an
awareness of- the basic purpose underlying the proximate cause re-
quirement and a continuing sensitivity to those affiliated factors rele-
vant to that basic purpose. Additionally, a court should show caution
and restraint in confronting a defense motion for directed verdict
premised on the assertion that the defendant's conduct was not a prox-
imate cause of the plaintiffs injury as a matter of law. Obviously, in
each case fn which the court concludes that a reasonable jury could
resolve the proximate cause issue either way, the motion for directed
verdict should be denied. It seems fair to assume, therefore, that
juries, more often than judges, will be charged with the responsibility
of making the dispositive determination of proximate cause issues. '
106. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying note 83 supra.
107. 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). See text accompanying note 71 supra.
108. 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978). See text accompanying note 89 supra.
109. See notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra.
110. See PROSSER, note 2 supra:
In any case where there might be reasonable difference of opinion as to the
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Yet, all too frequently, judicial instructions to juries required to
resolve proximate cause issues offer little more than the terseness
found in a legal dictionary.'11
Even assuming that the instructions are complemented by additional
language associating the generalities with the specific evidence heard
by the jury, it is apparent that the jury will be given no insight into
the basic reason for the proximate cause requirement and no assist-
ance in identifying those practical concerns which are related to that
basic reason. Consequently, while the court may have denied the
defendant's motion for directed verdict because of the court's deter-
mination that a reasonable jury could resolve the proximate cause
foreseeability of a particular risk, the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct
with respect to it, or the normal character of an intervening cause, the question is
for the jury, subject of course to suitable instructions from the court as to the legal
conclusion to be drawn as the issue is determined either way. By far the greater
number of the cases which have arisen have been of this description; and to this ex-
tent it may properly be said that "proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact
for the jury, to be solved by the exercise of good common sense in the considera-
tion of the evidence of each particular case."
Id. at 290 (footnotes omitted).
111. Insofar as the instructions do not embody the concepts of which proximate cause
consists, it is unlikely that the jury's determination will express those concepts, resulting
in a nonapplication of the law even in those cases where the verdict appears satisfactory.
Some fairly typical examples of judicial instructions evidence the dearth of this conceptual
background:
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous se-
quence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause - the
one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. It may
operate directly or by putting intervening agencies in motion.
Standardized Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, Instruction No. 64, 50 (rev.
ed. 1968).
This does not mean that the law seeks and recognizes only one proximate cause of
injury, consisting of only one factor, one act, one element or circumstance, or the
conduct of only one person. To the contrary, several factors, for example, the acts
and omissions of two or more persons, may work concurrently as the efficient cause
of an injury, and in such a case, each of the participating acts or omissions is
regarded in law as a proximate cause.
Id., Instruction No. 65 at 51 (to be added in cases involving concurring causes).
When the negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, whether committed
independently or in the course of concerted conduct, contribute concurrently, and
as proximate causes, to the injury of another, each of such persons is liable (in the
absence of contributor, negligence). This is true regardless of the relative degree of
the contribution. It is no defense for one of such persons that some other person,
not joined as a defendant in the action participated in causing the injury, even if it
should appear to you that the negligence of that other person was greater, in either
its wrongful nature or it effect.
Id., Instruction No. 66 at 52 (to be added in cases involving concurring causes and multiple
defendants).
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issue either way, there is no assurance and very little likelihood that
the jury's factual resolution will be a product of those considerations
presumably weighed by the court in determining the legal sufficiency
of the plaintiffs case, a patently undesirable outcome."'
One could assert, of course, that once the court has found the plain-
tiff's case legally sufficient in terms of the basic purpose of the prox-
imate cause requirement and those factors intimately related to that
purpose, there is no compelling need to instruct the jury on that
reason and those factors. By concluding that a reasonable jury could
resolve the proximate cause issue either way, the court has already
determined that a jury verdict for the plaintiff would not impose
liability wholly disproportionate to culpability. Therefore, there is no
reason to supply the jury with anything more tedious than a lexicog-
rapher's definition of proximate cause. The a priori logic of this ap-
proach is somewhat appealing; however, for several reasons, the ap-
proach is inapposite.
The basic reason for the proximate cause requirement and each of
the affiliated factors would seem to be ideally suited for jury con-
sideration. It is the jury which ostensibly serves as a microcosm of
society. The determinations of whether or not the imposition of liabil-
ity would be incommensurate with culpability, the degree of culpability
of a defendant's conduct, and the social utility of a defendant's ac-
tivities should reflect the societal perspective which a jury has the
unique power to express.
Second, in the case of a jury which is aware of the underlying
reason for the proximate cause requirement and is instructed on the
factors intimately related to that reason, its deliberations are much
more likely to achieve results manifesting those underlying considera-
tions. A jury instructed on a merely mechanical definition of proximate
cause will probably achieve an unprincipled result.
Finally, despite any doubt of a jury's capabilities, it is possible for
its members to work efficiently with those underlying considerations
and to apply them rationally to a particular set of facts. Jurors can be
extraordinarily competent and conscientious in their deliberations,
given a court sympathetic to their needs; it is not naive to believe that
with court guidance, jurors can collectively achieve a level of sophisti-
cation and perception which will exceed the total of their individual
capacities in almost any other environment. The more conscientious a
court is in affording the jury with comprehensible and informative in-
112. See J. HENDERSON, JR. & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS (1975) where the
authors state: "And finally in many cases the resolution of the proximate cause issue will
depend on the degree of particularity with which the judge or jury defines the reasonably
foreseeable consequences. The more general the description, the more likely will be the
conclusion that the actual consequences were foreseeable." Id. at 420-21.
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structions, the greater the likelihood that the jury will apply those in-
structions intelligently and assiduously to its interpretation of the
facts evidenced at trial. Consequently, the broader judicial determina-
tion to deny a defendant's motion for nonsuit or directed verdict will
ultimately provide the opportunity for a more refined application, by a
reasoning jury, of those concepts that form the principle of proximate
cause.
